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Abstract Current architectures for social agents are designed around some
specific units of social behaviour that address particular challenges. Although
their performance might be adequate for controlled environments, deploying
these agents in the wild is difficult. Moreover, the increasing demand for au-
tonomous agents capable of living alongside humans calls for the design of more
robust social agents that can cope with diverse social situations. We believe
that to design such agents, their sociality and cognition should be conceived
as one. This includes creating mechanisms for constructing social reality as
an interpretation of the physical world with social meanings and selective de-
ployment of cognitive resources adequate to the situation. We identify several
design principles that should be considered while designing agent architectures
for socio-cognitive systems. Taking these remarks into account, we propose a
socio-cognitive agent model based on the concept of Cognitive Social Frames
that allow the adaptation of an agent’s cognition based on its interpretation of
its surroundings, its Social Context. Our approach supports an agent’s reason-
ing about other social actors and its relationship with them. Cognitive Social
Frames can be built around social groups, and form the basis for social group
dynamics mechanisms and construct of Social Identity.
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1 Introduction
As social beings, people adapt their behaviour to live alongside other social
actors that surround them. From simple actions, such as greeting another
person, to more complex actions such as collaborating in group tasks, each
individual’s attitude changes to fit the reality that he/she is placed in. Never-
theless, the decision-making processes are not solely guided by external social
pressures; people have their own preferences and follow their own motives as
well, either influenced by their personality or past experiences. With multiple
conflicting pressures in their daily life, people are recurrently faced with situa-
tions where they need to balance between choosing what is socially acceptable,
pleasing others or their own desires. Furthermore, each person has their own
considerations about what is socially acceptable. These multiple views of social
conformity further increase the range of distinct and unique behaviour that
people may exhibit. In addition, their uniqueness is not only present during
the decision making process. In people’s daily encounters with other social
actors, the interpretation of their surroundings is a subjective process that
enables each individual to construct their own reality. This construal process
attaches a social dimension to the sensory perceptions that grant each indi-
vidual the capability to view the shared world from a unique perspective [3].
All the above remarks highlight how social behaviour is deeply linked to cog-
nition. Both influence each other to support the emergence of collective social
phenomena as well as adapting to individuals motives.
With the increasing presence of autonomous machines in people’s everyday
life, more efforts to integrate them into current societies should be made. To
achieve that, those machines must be endowed with social capabilities that
allow them to understand people, adjust to their everyday life and to some
extent, behave in a comparable manner. To become ubiquitous among humans,
not only must they interact with the environment in a believable way but
also reason over their actions’ social aspects. To grant them the latter, they
must comprehend the world as a social environment very much like humans
do. Social notions, such as norms, categories, groups, values, or roles, must
be embedded in the agent’s cognition as they are also an integral part of a
humans’ cognition [9]. Moreover, it is also hard to dissociate intelligence from
social life since the evolution of both is profoundly linked [6]. By interacting
with others, humans develop connections among them and, as demanded by
each situation, people adapt their behaviour by including other social actors
in their cognitive processes [8,24]. Additionally, through their interpretation
of the physical world, people mentally construct a unique representation of
their social reality in their minds [5]. Accordingly, there is a strong coupling
between cognition and social behaviour, and this connection is bidirectional.
Through social interactions, people are capable of improving and modifying
their cognition while they deploy their cognitive resources as needed based on
the social context they are placed in.
Endowing agents with social capabilities should be a larger effort than just
adding encapsulated social notions into agents, ironically similar to the way
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the word “social” was added to “agents” to create social agents. Attempting
to shape particular modules of “sociality” into agents will not benefit their
performance in real and complex social worlds [11]. While recognizing the
utility of designing specialized agents to address very precise tasks, applying an
ad hoc approach to the design of social agents will not promote the appearance
of general intelligence. Similarly, the inclusion of units of social behaviour
will prevent the conception of general social intelligence in agents. Looking
forward to developing agents that can be included in people’s everyday life,
the methodology used to design them must introduce human’s social behaviour
in all of their components, from the interaction with other social actors to
the selection of cognitive processes based on the situation. Therefore, to see
an increasing successful presence of social agents in people’s life, we argue
that novel architectures for socio-cognitive agents should be researched and
developed.
In the remaining sections, towards linking cognition to the social intel-
ligence of agents, we elaborate on some concerns that should be taken into
account by researchers. We enumerate five design principles that should be
considered throughout the design of agents for Socio-Cognitive Systems. Then,
we detail a computational model designed around the concept of Cognitive So-
cial Frames inspired by Social Identity Theory with special emphasis on our
notion of Social Context. Finally, we discuss some examples that can benefit
from using our Cognitive Social Frames, and we conclude with some perspec-
tives on future research on Socio-Cognitive Systems, namely, their importance
for the integration of agents in our society.
2 Design Principles
Despite the increasing presence of autonomous agents in people’s daily lives,
several researchers have highlighted the importance of understanding the so-
cial world in each individual’s cognition. This connection and its implications
have been a research topic that has called the attention of multiple theorists
that study this phenomenon, and computer scientists that recognize its impor-
tance in the design of intelligent agents. In the late ’90s, Castelfranchi argued
that intelligence is a social phenomenon and that in Artificial Intelligence,
researchers construct socially intelligent systems to understand it [6]. How-
ever, more recently, AI’s goal regarding social intelligence has shifted towards
designing and developing social agents that live alongside humans in a so-
cially adequate manner. Nevertheless, the need to create social agents should
not promote the inclusion of modules of social behaviour as additions to the
agent’s cognition [11]. Instead, an agent’s social nature should spread through
its cognition.
To guide the design of socio-cognitive agents, we elaborate on five design
principles that should be taken into account. For each one of them, we review
the relevant background from social sciences and highlight some relevant works
in Artificial Intelligence that explore it.
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2.1 Socially Situated Cognition
Humans’ actions are influenced by external factors. From characteristics of
the environment that restrict physical capabilities, to the presence of others
that demand an adaptation of the speech tone; for example, people adapt
their behaviour to the situation they are placed in. Clancey proposed the no-
tion of Situated Cognition to explain the process people use to adapt their
cognition based on their surroundings [8]. His proposal states that “all pro-
cesses of behaving, including speech, problem-solving, and physical skills, are
generated on the spot [...]”. Primarily motivated to describe how knowledge
is constructed in human’s minds, the author suggested that people’s cogni-
tive resources are deployed as required by the context. In Clancey’s proposal,
knowledge is described as inherently social, similar to human actions, defining
human’s activity as socially oriented as well as socially shaped [9]. Similarly,
Suchman also argued that not only physical but also social context can guide,
restrict, or even fully decide people’s actions [25].
To study situated cognition in a social context, Smith and Semin intro-
duced the concept of Socially Situated Cognition [24]. It proposes four dif-
ferent properties of cognition: cognition is for action, cognition is embodied,
cognition is situated, and cognition is distributed. The authors extensively
reviewed evidence that situated action enables the appearance of social cog-
nition. For instance, Schwarz argues that the perceivers’ perspective of the
context strengthens the sensitivity to external artefacts during attitude con-
strual [22].
We consider Socially Situated Cognition as one of the most important de-
sign principles to endow social agents with the capability to selectively deploy
their cognitive resources as the social environment requires. Although gener-
ating cognitive resources on the spot is not suitable for computational models,
as Clancey proposed, we agree that its capabilities should evolve with the
agent’s experience. Moreover, the sensitivity to the social context promotes
the recruitment of only a part of the cognition that is deemed necessary, re-
ducing the computational load on complex systems.
Socio-cognitive agents must be able to understand the situation (e.g., the
adequate social roles and norms, and the relationship of the social actors) and
act accordingly, but without losing the agency to choose whether to adhere to
social pressures that the situation upholds. In contrast to normative systems
that restrict agents’ actions to avoid a chaotic social world, we claim that socio-
cognitive agents should not be enforced to blindly change their behaviour by an
outside source. The agent’s cognition should be the one promoting the balance
between external pressures, such as social norms, and personal preferences.
Overall, the principle can be summarized as:
A Socio-Cognitive Agent must selectively deploy its cognitive resources, hence
adapting its behaviour, according to the Social Context.
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2.2 Social Context and Construal
From the objects available around people to their relationships with other so-
cial actors, the entities that surround people have a direct influence on their
cognitive processes. Nevertheless, not all humans ascribe similar meanings to
the same entities they see in the physical world. In addition to the sensory ex-
perience that generates a perception, people construct mental representations
of the world that are subject to an interpretative process.
One of the theories that explained the relationship of the self with the social
reality is Symbolic Interactionism [3]. First proposed by George Mead and later
published by Herbert Blume, the theory proposes that individuals interact
with each other based on the symbolic world they construct. Since “humans
act toward things on the basis of the meanings they ascribe to those things.”,
people can establish a link between their personal and unique view of entities
and use it to adapt their cognition. Moreover, by arguing that “the meanings
are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative process used by the
person in dealing with the things he/she encounters” the authors emphasize
that interpretation plays an important role when trying to understand the
social world people interact with.
When endowing intelligent agents with the ability to selectively filter their
computational processes based on the context they are placed in, there needs
to be an explicit connection between the external world and their internal
resources. Castelfranchi proposed that both physical context (relation to the
environment) and social context (relation to other social actors) were notewor-
thy elements that influenced the agent’s autonomy [5]. Additionally, several
researchers identified the importance of social context in the classification of
agents as “socially believable” [10,12]. To be portrayed as such, an external
observer should be able to perceive as meaningful the connection between the
agent’s identity, its behaviour and the social context.
From embodied virtual agents to social robots, the inclusion of autonomous
agents in people’s society requires them to understand people’s current prac-
tices and adhere to them when appropriate. Using the physical reality might
enable them to understand what the environment affords. However, we argue
that this is not enough. In addition to exploring the deployment of cognitive
resources based on world entities with physical properties, agents must rely
on the relationship between such elements and their frame of reference. En-
dowing them with the capability to reason on top of the social context that
represents a network of relationships between objects and social actors will
improve their chances of being perceived by humans as socially believable.
Following some theorists’ proposals, we argue that the design of social agents
must include a representation of the Social Context, that results from an in-
terpretative process that refines and extends the sensory stimulus with social
meaning. Therefore:
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A Socio-Cognitive Agent must be able to construct Social Context by means
of interpretative processes that ascribe social meaning to its sensory
information.
2.3 Social Categorization and Identity
Allport studied human’s natural process for thinking about others in terms
of their group memberships by means of Social Categorization [2]. As part of
their social nature, people tend to categorize other social actors on the basis
of their social groups’ memberships. Therefore, being able to recognize others’
social groups, a person can also identify himself based on his relationship to
such groups. This interaction between one’s identity as a group member and
the inter-group’s dynamics was elaborated by Social Identity Theory [26]. It
proposes that people are capable of constructing their social identity based on
their relationship with other social groups. Later, Adams and Hoggs predicted
that social identities can be taken as required by the situation, the Social
Context [1]. Together, both formulations suggest that humans can assume an
identity as they see fit while being capable of recognizing, and comparing to
others’ memberships. Brewer further elaborated on the inter-group behaviour,
by proposing that one, when adopting a social identity, balances the similarities
with other in-group members and the distinction between in-group and out-
group [4] members.
Owens et al. [19] studied two types of identity: role identities and personal
identities. The first refers to identities that can only exist when a relevant
counter-part is also present, for example, one cannot be a mother without
children. However, personal identity reflects one’s traits or characteristics that
are not linked to others’ social or role identities. As such, role identities present
an interesting way of adjusting one’s cognition based on the relationship with
the reality, namely, other social actors.
The application of Social Identity in computational systems is also a chal-
lenging task. To design social agents, the notion of social context cannot be
the only factor considered. If so, the individual nature of cognition can be lost.
Therefore, the inclusion of aspects related to Social Identity can stimulate the
individual differences of agents [9]. This distinction can be traced to people’s
different emotional attachment to each social group. Therefore, besides the
interpretation of the surroundings, socio-cognitive agents’ architectures must
also include mechanisms that allow them to reason about other actors’ mem-
berships and how one fits into the social world.
Social Identity Theory can provide insight into the mechanisms an agent
must accommodate to identify social categories and be able to define so-
cial groups. Furthermore, when placed together with other social actors, so-
cial agents must be capable of understanding the relationship between social
groups. Ultimately, while endowed with the possibility to recognizing others’
memberships and relate itself to them, an agent should be capable of construct-
ing its own social identity that reflects its preferences and personal history in
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the social world. Similar to how Social Context represents the agent’s interpre-
tation of the physical reality, its Social Identity serves as a manner to identify
how an agent positions itself within the social landscape filled with other social
actors distributed in social groups, so:
A Socio-Cognitive Agent must be able to attribute social categories to social
actors and understand their social meanings and relationship as part of the
construction of Social Context. Additionally, it should be able to position
itself in the social categorization space and have preferences over some social
categories.
2.4 Social Affordances
According to Gibson, affordances are the interactive opportunities offered by
the environment to an organism [13]. For instance, a book can afford several
types of interactions ranging from interactions that are more common, such as,
opening the book or reading its paragraphs, to other less orthodox interactions,
such as using it as a cup holder or a wobbly table’s stabilizer. However, an affor-
dance does not live inside the organism nor the environment; it emerges from
the ecological relationship between both parties [14]. Moreover, affordances re-
sult from the coupling of perceptual information with the organism’s cognitive
capabilities. Since Gibson’s theory of affordances was mainly conceived for di-
rect visual perception, his proposal did not detail the role of cognition on the
conception of affordances. Nevertheless, Gibson briefly challenged the affor-
dances’ original domain, alluding that other biological perceptions or cultural
processes may allow the emergence of other types of affordances. In the past
four decades, following his initial contributions, other researchers extended
the original theory and explored the cognition’s implications in recognition of
affordances.
Some researchers proposed that perceptions result from a mental recon-
struction of the physical world that is used to update our own internal rep-
resentation of our surroundings [21]. However, such theories did not consider
the role of the organism’s cognition in the perception process. By exploring
the cognition’s impact on the theory of affordances, other researchers suggest
that perception through sensory inputs is highly influenced by the cognitive
capabilities of an organism [7]. For example, Hirsh et al. proposed that per-
ceptions can be understood as interpretations of the sensory input based on
past experiences, expectations, and motives [15]. Others suggested that the
perceiver’s culture affects salience of some affordances, namely, the ones called
social affordances [16]. Zhang and Patel, based on the distributed cognition
framework, defined an affordance as a representation shared between the en-
vironment and the organism that can be categorized as biological, physical,
perceptual, or cognitive [29], where the latter category refers to affordances
provided by cultural conventions. Authors from distinct disciplines propose
new interpretations to the ambiguous concept of affordance proposed by Gib-
son, but a common aspect was shared between their theories: cognition guides
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the attention mechanism that enables organisms to construct their internal
representation of the physical reality.
The theory of affordance is also relevant while designing computational
models for agents, primarily to help construct perceptions based on the re-
sources agents can deploy. Particularly, agents’ architectures should consider
potential interactions with other social actors as social affordances. Indeed,
some computer science researchers have explored agents’ social affordances
across multiple domains. In accordance with Gibson’s theory, Kreijns proposed
a definition of social affordance to be applied in Computer-Supported Collab-
orative Learning [17]. The authors highlight the need for the CSCL environ-
ment to stimulate the group members’ intervention while reciprocally when a
member becomes salient to another, the social affordances must help guide the
second member to engage in appropriate interaction with the first. The ecolog-
ical stance of social affordances also found relevancy across the field of Human-
Robot Interaction [18,28]. Whether to improve a robot’s planning capabilities
by learning others’ social affordances from the physical environment [20,27],
or by learning an affordance grammar from videos [23], approaches that use
the theory of affordances can be found in multiple research works about social
robots.
In practice, we argue that social affordances, as proposed by Gibson and
later reiterated by other researchers, present an interesting method for de-
signing social agents, particularly to define their interactions with other social
actors. By first identifying the bidirectional relationship between the perceiver
and the surrounding social world, an agent can recognize opportunities for
interaction with others. This principle can be summarized as:
A Socio-Cognitive Agent must be able to identify social affordances in the
presence of other social actors.
2.5 Socially Affordable
Alongside its ecological motivation, social affordances can also bring technical
improvements for social agents. Gibson argued that perception is not about
passively constructing an internal representation of the world, but rather about
actively picking up information of interest to ones behaviour [14]. As such, an
agent that only perceives information that is worth considering reduces its set
of relevant perceptions. Computationally, it means creating an attention pro-
cess that allows an agent to filter the perceptions based on their relevancy to
its cognition. Nevertheless, this approach may not be sufficient to create agents
that are more socially capable. Being able to recognize social affordances, op-
portunities for interaction with other social actors in the environment, does
not necessarily mean that those potential interactions are adequate for the So-
cial Context. Instead, understanding the distinction between what is possible,
the mentioned affordances, and what is appropriate, hence, socially affordable,
endows agents with the capability to adhere to social conformity.
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Let us revisit our previous example, the book’s affordances are directly
related to its capabilities and the physical environment the book is placed
in. However, as social actors, people also take into account the setting of the
interaction and what is deemed appropriate for each context. While using a
book as a cup holder at home might not be questionable, the same action
in a library might be inadmissible. The same principle applies to other types
of affordances, such as social affordances. Whereas engaging a fellow reader
in a library to dance can be considered inappropriate, the same interaction
at home may be seen as adequate. To mimic this social awareness into agents
through affordances, the environment must be perceived as an enabler of some
opportunities that are socially affordable. Thus, an agent must be capable of
representing and deploying social information regarded as relevant during the
attention process, such as the relationship between other social actors and
other physical entities.
Such a distinction between affordances, including social, and what is so-
cially affordable, emphasizes the separation between the actions that are deemed
possible and the ones that are socially acceptable. This knowledge regarding
social conformity grants social agents the capability to engage in interactions
with the environment and other social actors that fit their context, therefore:
A Socio-Cognitive Agent must be able to recognize which affordances are
socially affordable - adequate for the Social Context.
3 Cognitive Social Frames
Humans live alongside other social actors. As members of society, we need
to adapt our actions to fit others’ expectations. Similarly, social agents must
change their behaviour according to their reality. To endow this capability to
socio-cognitive agents, from virtual agents to robots, we must develop mech-
anisms to adapt their cognition based on their interpretation of the physical
reality. Taking into account the principles elaborated in Section 2, we propose
a computational model based on the concept of Cognitive Social Frame.
A Cognitive Social Frame (CSF) is the core element of a framework that en-
ables the adjustment of the agent’s cognition based on its interpretation of the
surroundings. The latter is an internal representation of the agent’s relation-
ship with the things and other social actors placed in the world. This mental
representation is called Social Context. The agent’s cognition is encapsulated
into several abstract blocks called Cognitive Resources. They contain specific
knowledge and mechanisms used to determine the agent’s actions. Finally, each
CSF establishes a link between the Social Context and the relevant Cognitive
Resources, that will be used to determine which Cognitive Resources should be
deployed. In addition to the internal representation of these concepts, we also
describe the agent’s mechanism used to regulate the Cognitive Social Frames.
We propose an approach with five stages that includes the process to interpret
the perceptions and update the deployed Cognitive Resources.
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In the remaining section, we detail the elements of the agent’s architecture
and how they are grouped. Then, we describe the several stages of the agent’s
mechanism and how its multiple components of the model interact with each
other. Finally, we elaborate on some interesting phenomena that could be
modelled with Cognitive Social Frames and how we align the model’s goals
with the design principles previously elaborated on.
3.1 Architecture
We propose an abstract architecture that supports the selective deployment
of multiple cognitive resources depending on the agent’s social context. To
distinguish between the resources that are related to the core mechanism of
the Cognitive Social Frames and the resources related to the task, we split
them across two groups, as shown in Figure 1. Additionally, we also group
the concepts in two memory groups that help manage the agents’ resources:
Sensory Memory, Working Memory, and Long-Term Memory.
Fig. 1 Cognitive Social Frame’s architecture. Its elements are grouped across two dimen-
sions: the relevancy for the task or the core CSF mechanism, and the memory type
Throughout its interactions with the environment, the agent will receive
new perceptions and interpret them. This process results in new Social Con-
texts that will guide the adjustment of the agent’s cognition. The connection
between the Social Context and the agent’s cognition is represented by the
concept of Cognitive Social Frame. Although the agent holds a collection of
possible CSFs, at a certain moment, only a subset of those is considered ap-
propriate for the Social Context, called salient Cognitive Social Frames. Each
CSF identifies the proper Cognitive Resources to deploy when it is salient.
Our architecture does not impose limitations regarding the internal processes
of each Cognitive Resource. However, some restrictions regarding the knowl-
edge accessibility are established.
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3.1.1 Memory
The computational model’s architecture organizes its elements into three types
of memory: the Sensory Memory, the Working Memory, and the Long-Term
Memory. Each memory type clusters concepts that have different lifetimes and
salience.
Sensory Memory This memory group contains information about the agent’s
perceptions gathered from its sensors. The lifetime of the elements in this
memory is very short as they are discarded right after they are interpreted
by the agent. The Cognitive Resources of the agent, namely, the ones related
to the tasks, do not use the sensory memory’s perceptions directly. Instead,
the agent’s internal Cognitive Resources access its interpretation of the social
world, the Social Context, rather than the unfiltered perceptions containing
information about its physical surroundings.
Working Memory The Working Memory holds information about the current
Social Context, the salient Cognitive Social Frames and other relevant data
for the Cognitive Resources currently deployed. The elements of this memory
group have a short lifetime as they are constantly being manipulated by other
Cognitive Resources as well as by the core updating process of the Cognitive
Social Frames. The Social Context is frequently updated by the agent based
on the interpretation of new perceptions. This Working Memory’s resource
is used by the Cognitive Resources of the agents as well as by the salient
Cognitive Social Frame updating mechanism. Alongside these two elements,
the working memory also holds other memory resources used and managed by
the Cognitive Resources deployed.
Long-Term Memory The elements inside this memory group do not change
as often as the ones from the Sensory and Working Memory. In addition to
storing other persistent elements used by the reasoning resources, the Long-
Term Memory holds information about all the Cognitive Social Frames. Al-
though not repeatedly modified, these elements are deployed as requested by
the agent’s other processes, such as the CSF’s update mechanism.
3.1.2 Cognitive Social Frame
A Cognitive Social Frame is a representation that describes the relationship
between the agent’s Social Context and its available Cognitive Resources. At a
certain instant, multiple CSFs can be appropriate for the same Social Context.
Similar to the terminology used by the Social Identity Theory, we use the term
salience to describe the current relevancy of each CSF. In addition to that, each
CSF defines a construal mechanism that is triggered when the agent perceives
the environment. It is a process that supports the creation of a Social Context
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as a personal interpretation of the physical world rather than just a collection
of sensory stimuli. A Cognitive Social Frame can be formally defined as
CSF = {construal, fitness, CognitiveResources},
Construal is a function that, based on the agent’s perceptions in the Sensory
Memory, constructs a Social Context. This function can be seen as a two-phase
process. The first, inspired by Gibson’s Theory of Affordances, resembles an
attention mechanism that filters the agent’s perception based on its relevancy
for the respective CSF. The second phase, motivated by the interpretative
view of a human’s perception as proposed by Symbolic Interactionism and
Social Identity Theory, transforms the set of perceptions into a collection of
social perceptions that carries the agent’s relationship to things and other
social actors. The two phases combined result is a function that creates a
Social Context that will guide the agent’s deployed cognitive resources. The
construal function signature is:
Construal : Perceptions 7−→ SocialContext
Fitness is a function that tests if the Cognitive Social Frame fits the agent’s
context. Both the external pressures, defined in the Social Context, and the
internal drives of the agent, present in the Cognitive Resources inside Working
Memory, should influence the salience of the CSF. The outcome of the fitness
function will contribute to determining whether or not the CSF should be
considered salient.
Fitness : WorkingMemory 7−→]0, 1]
Cognitive Resources is the collection of the Cognitive Resources that will be
deployed when the Cognitive Social Frame is considered salient.
3.1.3 Social Context
The agent’s Social Context is a mental construct that describes the agent’s
interpretation of the surroundings at a given time. Without restricting the
structure of its content, our computational model suggests that the underlying
representation of the Social Context should be similar to the one used to
represent perceptions. Conceptually, the units of knowledge that compose the
perceptions directly gathered from the environment should be much alike than
the ones that constitute the Social Context. However, in practice, the ones that
form the latter must carry a social dimension that the former does not support,
resulting in Social Perceptions.
The genesis of a Social Context is the result of a two-phase construal
process. The first focuses on the agent’s attention, filtering the perceptions,
whereas the second annexes a social layer that results from an interpretation
of such perceptions. As such, Social Context can be defined as follows
SocialContext = {SocialPerception1, ...SocialPerceptionn}.
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3.1.4 Cognitive Resources
Our model does not focus on providing mechanisms to address particular chal-
lenges, such as planning, decision-making, and natural language processing.
Nonetheless, the abstract nature of our framework includes room for such re-
sources to be included. Within our architecture, these elements are encased in
Cognitive Resources. For instance, a cognitive resource can be used to repre-
sent knowledge, drives and restrictions for behaviour, such as a set of beliefs,
motivations, or norms, or can represent mechanisms such as decision-making
processes or planning techniques. From the Cognitive Social Frames’ perspec-
tive, each Cognitive Resources is an independent service that is used to gen-
erate behaviour for specific tasks.
Fig. 2 An abstract representation of several Cognitive Resources associated with two dif-
ferent Cognitive Social Frames, CSF1 and CSF2. Three types of Cognitive Resources are
depicted, namely, to represent norms, beliefs and a planning mechanism.
Although our model is not directly concerned with the contents of each
Cognitive Resource, the agent is responsible for deploying them as befitting
for the current state of the agent, that is, as prescribed by the salient Cog-
nitive Social Frames. However, due to the high abstraction drawn between
the deployment of Cognitive Resources and their internal processes, a Cog-
nitive Resource may compromise the boundaries of other deployed resources
by freely accessing everything in the agent’s memory. Therefore, we introduce
some rules to preserve the resources deployed by each CSF; otherwise, a Cog-
nitive Resource would be able to ignore the mechanism that sets the salient
Cognitive Resources based on the Social Context. Therefore, Cognitive Re-
source information management should obey some restrictions regarding its
accessibility:
1. A Cognitive Resource does not have access to the Sensory Memory. As
a result, all observations of the world should be made through the Social
Context.
2. A Cognitive Resource can use all the information available in the Working
Memory whether or not it was maintained or produced by itself or other
resources.
3. A Cognitive Resource has access to the Cognitive Social Frames in Long-
Term memory. Therefore, it can rely on knowledge about the representation
of other CSFs, besides the salient ones.
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3.2 Agent’s Mechanism
An agent’s capability to perceive the environment and produce actions is also
how our model defines the agent’s interaction with the environment. However,
rather than following the classic perceive, think and act loop, we claim that
some mandatory additional steps should be included for socio-cognitive agents.
We suggest an approach that defines the agent’s mechanism as a five-stage
process: Perceive, Interpret, Update, Execute and Act. Each one of these phases
manipulates different concepts present in the agent’s architecture. Algorithm 1
highlights the core steps in the agent’s cognition from the instant it perceives
the environment to the moment it acts on the world.
Algorithm 1 Agent’s Mechanism
1: function Cycle(Environment)
2: Perceptions = PERCEIV E(Environment)
3: SocialContext = INTERPRET (Perceptions, CSFsalient)
4: CSFsalient, Resourcesdeployed = UPDATE(CSF, SocialContext)
5: Actions = EXECUTE(SocialContext, Resourcesdeployed)
6: ACT (Actions)
7: end function
Following the abstraction previously stated between the Cognitive Social
Frames core elements and the Cognitive Resources, the agent’s mechanism
does not cover details about the mechanisms inside each Cognitive Resource.
3.2.1 Perceive
The perception of the agent is the first phase of the agent’s loop and represents
the observation of the physical environment by the agent through sensory
stimuli. The result is a set of perceptions that is transferred to the agent’s
Sensory Memory.
3.2.2 Interpret
This phase is responsible for filtering the perception in the Sensory Memory
and constructing the Social Context of the agent. After filtering the Sensory
Memory’s perceptions based on the salient Cognitive Social Frame and then
transforming them into other social perceptions based on the physical world,
the resulting Social Context is transferred to the Working Memory. Algo-
rithm 2 enumerates the steps of this phase.
At the start of the interpretation phase, the Social Context is cleared. Then,
the agent uses the construal process associated with each salient Cognitive
Social Frame to transform the set of perceptions into a set of social perceptions,
the Social Context. In spite of not being transferred from one execution of the
agent’s mechanism to the next, the Social Context still accommodates the
impact of the agent’s previous state when interpreting the perceptions. Since
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Algorithm 2 Agent’s Interpretation
1: function Interpret(Perceptions, CSFsalient)
2: SocialContext = ∅
3: for each csf ∈ CSFsalient do
4: SocialContext = SocialContext ∪ csf.Construal(Perceptions)
5: end for
6: return SocialContext
7: end function
the interpretation phase considers the salient Cognitive Social Frames; the
resulting Social Context accounts indirectly for the previous events that lead
to the current set of CSFs. Instead of updating the previous Social Context, the
proposed mechanism relies on other elements of the agent’s memory that were
previously updated to interpret the physical world. This level of indirection
grants to the agent the capability to rapidly shift the Social Context when
noteworthy perceptions are received.
Because there are multiple salient CSFs at the same time, there will be
several social contexts as well. Their union will result in a collection of social
perceptions that can have ambiguity, that is, different CSFs can generate the
same social perceptions. Furthermore, it can also produce conflicting social
perceptions, since multiple CSFs can lead to distinct, eventually conflicting,
interpretations of the same physical world.
For instance, let us consider a person that is responsible for coaching the
school’s football team. Additionally, one of the kids on that team is this per-
son’s son. On the one hand, as a football coach, this person wants the team
to perform well and, to do so, he needs to identify the problems that could
impact the team’s success. On the other hand, as a father, he wants to see
his son play. During a game where his son is performing poorly, the father,
based on the mentioned different views, interprets the situation differently. As
a football coach he sees his son as responsible for the team’s problems whereas
as a father, he sees his son as deserving the opportunity to play. Modelling
the father and coach roles as Cognitive Social Frames, when faced with the
perception of his son, the two CSF construals produce conflicting social per-
ceptions that coexist in the same Social Context: one that identifies the son
as a liability, and another as a young player that deserves a chance.
The resulting Social Context can accommodate social perceptions that may
lead to the deployment of conflicting goals or actions in the agent’s cognition.
This allows the emergence of internal dilemmas that should be addressed by
the mechanisms encapsulated in the Cognitive Resources.
3.2.3 Update
After constructing the Social Context, the agent has a perspective on the
surrounding reality. Therefore, the previous salient Cognitive Social Frames
may not be appropriate anymore. This process selects the Cognitive Social
Frames in the Long-Term Memory that satisfy the fitness condition. However,
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the salience is also determined by the personal preference of the agents. To
consider the external pressure exerted by the Social Context and the agent’s
internal pressure, we propose that salience is calculated as a balance between
fitness and preference. As a result, the Salience of a Cogntive Social Frame
csf, for the Social Context SC can be defined as
Salience : CognitiveSocialFrame, SocialContext 7−→ [−1, 1],
and should satisfy the following properties:
1. The salience should be proportional to the value of Cognitive Social Frame
fitness based on the Social Context, given by csf.fitness(SC). As such, the
CSFs that are considered by the agent to be more appropriate than other
CSFs should have a greater value of fitness.
2. The salience should be proportional to the agent’s preference for each Cog-
nitive Social Frame, given by preference(csf). This property represents the
agent’s personal inclination towards each CSF.
The second property of this function, mentions the preference function.
Conceptually, it represents the agent’s choice from the set of available Cog-
nitive Social Frames without considering the Social Context. That is, there
might be an internal drive, need, or motivator, that influences the salience of
a CSF. This function can be defined as:
preference : CognitiveSocialFrame 7−→ [−1, 1].
Overall, the Update stage is responsible for altering the agent’s Salient
CSFs in the Working Memory and, as such, modify the set of deployed Cogni-
tive Resources. As shown in Algorithm 3, this phase uses the current SocialContext
and the entire set of CognitiveSocialFrames present in the Long-Term Mem-
ory. The first step of this phase is to calculate the new set of Cognitive Social
Frames. To do so, based on the current Social Context, the agent iterates
through all the CSFs to determine if their salience is greater than a certain
threshold salience. Then, based on the resources associated with all the mem-
bers of the new set of salient CSFs, the agent identifies the new collection of
cognitive resources that should be deployed.
In our current model, the process of deploying new Cognitive Resources
is a fairly simple substitution of the methods already present in the agent’s
Working Memory. However, this produces a sudden change in the set of de-
ployed cognitive resources instead of a smooth transition where the previous
resources would gradually lose relevance in the agent’s cognition. Although
discussing alternatives for implementing the deployment of new Cognitive Re-
sources should depend on the scenario of the application of the agent; we
propose two different approaches that could be followed.
Rather than solely having a mechanism to deploy the Cognitive Resources,
there could be a symmetrical process to undeploy them. As such, after deter-
mining the new set of salient CSFs, the agent would calculate the subset of
Cognitive Resources present in the Working Memory that need to be removed
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Algorithm 3 Agent’s CSF Update Mechanism
1: function Update(SocialContext, CSF )
2: CSFsalient = ∅
3: for each csf ∈ CSF do
4: if Salience(csf, SocialContext) > salience then
5: CSFsalient = CSFsalient ∪ csf
6: end if
7: end for
8: Resourcesdeployed = ∅
9: for each csf ∈ CSFsalient do
10: Resourcesdeployed = Resourcesdeployed ∪ csf.resources
11: end for
12: return CSFsalient, Resourcesdeployed
13: end function
and trigger an undeployment process specific to each Cognitive Resource. An-
other possible approach is to apply the salience mechanism of the CSF directly
to the Cognitive Resources. That is, each deployed Cognitive Resource would
have a salience value that would continuously decrease with time, such as a de-
cay. The deployed Cognitive Resources would see their salience value renewed
if the Social Context identified them, through the salient CSF resources, as
worthy of being deployed and in this case maintained. When a Cognitive Re-
source’ salience is lower than a certain threshold, it is then discarded from the
set of deployed resources.
3.2.4 Execute
In this phase, the agent does not manipulate any core elements of the architec-
ture directly associated with the Cognitive Social Frames model. Instead, the
updated set of deployed Cognitive Resources, with access to the new Social
Context present in the Working Memory, is executed.
As previously described, the Cognitive Resources are the agent’s units of
cognition that target specific problem-solving, decision-making, reasoning ca-
pabilities, and others. They can either contain knowledge or processes. Only
the processes have an executable nature and, therefore, they will be executed.
Nevertheless, although not running any procedures, the Cognitive Resources
that hold knowledge can also be manipulated by the other type of Cognitive
Resources.
This phase can be characterized by the high degree of abstraction that en-
capsulates the agent’s ability to reason, decide, or interact with the world, away
from the mechanism used to guarantee its conformity with the social context.
While executing the deployed Cognitive Resources, whatever the outcome, it
is already in accordance with the agent’s Social Context. Nevertheless, there
are some Cognitive Resources that can use the core Cognitive Social Frames
concepts, namely, the CSFs.
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3.3 Discussion
The proposed computational model’s goal is to enable the creation of socio-
cognitive agents that have the capability to adapt their cognition according
to the social context, i.e., their interpretation of the social world. Our model
fulfils this goal, by introducing a mechanism based on the concept of Cognitive
Social Frame, which work as the link between the agent’s social context and its
cognition. The design of the mechanism we propose was guided by the design
principles previously described.
Aligned with the design principle of Socially Situated Cognition (Section 2.1),
the main motivation of Cognitive Social Frames is to establish a link between
the agent’s situation, formally represented in the Social Context and its cog-
nition, encapsulated in its Cognitive Resources. As such, the agent is sensitive
to the view of the surrounding world when deploying its cognitive resources.
However, it is important to note that this sensitivity to the Social Context
should not be confused with dependency. Although the agent takes into ac-
count the Social Context, using our model, its cognition’s deployment is also
influenced by its own preferences.
A socio-cognitive agent implementing our mechanism can interpret the
world, as stated in the Social Context and Contrual principle (Section 2.2),
rather than just perceiving it. The second stage of our mechanism allows a
socio-cognitive agent to construct a mental representation, the Social Context,
describing its relationship with perceived elements. This Social Context is
the set of social perceptions that result from the application of each salient
Cognitive Social Frame construal function. This function is responsible for
filtering the agent’s perceptions and then applying a social layer on top of
them. As such, the Social Context enables the observer to allow its cognition
to reason about the meaning of the elements of the physical world instead of
the elements by themselves.
Additionally, in the interpretation phase, the agent can construct a Social
Context. This process is also influenced by the salient Cognitive Social Frames.
Therefore, the interpretation of the reality is performed from the agent’s frame
of reference with regard to its relevance to the agent’s cognition. As stated in
the Social Affordances principle (Section 2.4), a socio-cognitive agent should
perceive what is worth paying attention to and identify social interaction op-
portunities in the Social Context. Our proposal supports this suggestion since
it only applies the construal function of the salient CSFs relevant for the cog-
nition, to create the Social Context. The principle described in Section 2.5
emphasizes that a socio-cognitive agent should recognize what is socially af-
fordable. In line with this remark, a Cognitive Social Frame represents the
Cognitive Resources that are associated with a particular Social Context and,
to a certain degree, it also dictates how the agent can interact with the world.
Moreover, while building the Social Context, CSFs are attributed to other so-
cial actors as well. This supports the identification of social affordances, but at
the same time is a mechanism that enables certain mind-reading capabilities
in the agent.
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Finally, one of the most promising aspects of our proposal is related to
the principle of Social Categorization and Identity(Section 2.3). The concept
of Cognitive Social Frames supports the appearance of the concept of Social
Identity by enabling a socio-cognitive agent to identify its and others’ social
categories. When placed in a world with other social actors, an agent capable
of representing the concept of CSF can also assign to others their salient CSFs.
Furthermore, it can also reason about its beliefs regarding others’ salient CSF
and their social categories. However, this principle also claims that not only
should a socio-cognitive agent recognize others’ group memberships but also
be able to construct its own social identity based on its relationship with the
social category, by defining personal preferences over some identities. Regard-
ing the first, a Cognitive Social Frame can be used as the concept that enables
the categorization of social actors and, therefore, defines groups of social ac-
tors that share similar CSFs. With interest to the second, the mechanism we
propose allows the Cognitive Resources to reason about the concept of Cog-
nitive Social Frames and project into others’ salient CSFs, modelling others’
categories. With this information, an agent can explore its relationship with
other social actors, considering their memberships, towards defining its own
Social Identity.
In addition, by considering the salient CSFs of other social actors with its
own cognition, an agent is capable of reasoning about others’ deployed Cog-
nitive Resources and, therefore, acknowledge their beliefs, goals, mechanisms,
and others. This mind-reading capability can enhance the social dimension of
such agents since they can now expect and predict others’ actions based on
their salient Cognitive Social Frames. Furthermore, this mind-reading capa-
bility can be extended from the recognition of what Cognitive Resources are
deployed to how another social actor interprets the physical world, thus cre-
ating Social Contexts from other frames of reference. Combining the two, the
Social Context and Cognitive Social Frames, a socio-cognitive agent has, to
an extent, a mind-reading mechanism that allows it to understand the world
from others’ perspectives and potentially anticipate others’ behaviours.
The ability to mind-read other social actors can help an agent establish re-
lationships with other social actors. Instead of looking at the environment as a
mere collection of opportunities for interaction, focusing on the interpersonal
relationship with others creates agents that are more socially capable. While
interacting with other social actors, an agent has a better chance of success-
fully engaging with them if it is aware of their drives, beliefs, norms and other
aspects that can be derived from their salient Cognitive Social Frames. With
this information, when interacting with other social actors, a socio-cognitive
agent can search for common grounds with its interlocutors, thus strengthen-
ing their interpersonal relationship. We can use CSFs to explore the discrete
(based on categories) nature of social relationships that are often treated as a
continuous variable in multi-agent systems. For example, we can define a CSF
for friends and another for acquaintances and define in each the social norms
that apply when the agent meets other actors that fit the CSF.
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Additionally, agents with mind-reading capabilities can use their knowledge
about others’ interpretation of the reality to manipulate the constructing of
their Social Context, in particular, the identity (e.g., salient CSF) that others
ascribe to the agent. Managing others’ impressions about itself requires a socio-
cognitive agent to reason about others’ construction of the Social Context.
Looking forward to inducing perceptions that will influence other’s views about
itself, an agent can either adjust the information exchanged with others or
modify the environment such that their construction of the Social Context
alters the other’s interpretation of the social reality.
4 Conclusion
Our everyday life takes place in social worlds that have started to welcome new
intelligent autonomous agents to live alongside humans. To properly adjust
them to people’s social lives, they must be endowed with social capabilities
that allow them to adapt their interaction with the surrounding social actors.
We claim that social agents would be more capable of successfully engaging
others if they could change their cognition based on the social context they
are placed in. For example, agents should know the role they play in a given
context and should be able to change the role if the context changes.
In this document, we identified some design principles that should be taken
into account when conceiving socio-cognitive agents to live alongside other so-
cial actors. We explored the implications of some theories proposed by soci-
ologists and psycho-sociologists in computational models. Overall, we look to
social sciences as an extremely helpful source of knowledge when engineering
social behaviour.
We proposed the Cognitive Social Frames model that establishes a relation-
ship between a personal construct of the physical world, the Social Context,
and the agent’s Cognitive Resources. Its mechanism allows the agent to inter-
pret the shared reality based on its salient CSFs and deploy different Cognitive
Resources to match the requirements of the environment. Bounding the agents’
relationship with reality, the Social Context, with its internal processes, the
Cognitive Elements, our model establishes a framework that promotes the de-
ployment of socio-cognitive agents alongside other social actors living in an
environment filled with social rules and opportunities for interaction.
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